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A MODERN LOOK AT THE RIGHT TO A CIVIL JURY 
TRIAL UNDER THE MAINE CONSTITUTION 
Carolyn Liegner* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Article I, Section 20 of the Maine Constitution states “In all civil suits, and in 
all controversies concerning property, the parties shall have a right to a trial by jury, 
except in cases where it has heretofore been otherwise practiced . . . .”1  The 
exception noted in Section 20 has been the subject of multiple interpretations by the 
Maine Supreme Judicial Court, sitting as the Law Court, since the ratification of the 
Maine Constitution in 1820.  This has resulted in inconsistency in Maine case law, 
as well as a significant shift in the right to a civil jury trial over time.   
The confusion appears to be rooted in an erroneous reliance on the United States 
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Seventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.2  
The language granting a civil jury trial right under the Maine Constitution differs 
from the language of the Seventh Amendment,3 yet for several years, the Law Court 
mirrored the accepted interpretation of the Seventh Amendment in its interpretation 
of Article I, Section 20.4  Under this view, the Maine Constitution “preserves the 
right to a jury trial in civil actions where that right existed when the Maine 
Constitution was adopted.”5  In other words, actions that did not exist prior to 1820, 
as well as actions that had no right to a jury trial at common law, do not have the 
right to a jury trial under this interpretation.  In 1986, the Law Court first used this 
reading of Article I, Section 20 to determine there to be no jury trial right for traffic 
infractions with a penalty of license revocation in State v. Anton.6  The Law Court 
reasoned that because license revocation was not a remedy at common law, there is 
currently no jury trial right for such an action.7   
This interpretation was extended by the Law Court in Dir. of Bureau of Labor 
Standards v. Fort Halifax Packing Co.8  In this decision, the court affirmed the trial 
court’s holding that there is no right to a jury trial in actions involving the state’s 
severance pay statute.  The court reasoned that because no such action existed at 
common law, using the interpretation introduced in Anton, there is no right to a jury 
                                                                                                     
 * J.D. Candidate, University of Maine School of Law, Class of 2017.  The Author is grateful to 
Associate Professor Dmitry Bam for his guidance throughout the writing process, and to Justice Wayne 
Douglas for asking the hard questions.  The Author would like to thank her family for always cheering 
her on, especially her husband, Adam, and daughter, Claire. 
 1. ME. CONST. art. I, § 20 (emphasis added). 
 2. Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. Co. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211, 217 (1916) (holding that “the 7th 
Amendment applies only to proceedings in courts of the United States, and does not in any manner 
whatever govern or regulate trials by jury in state courts . . . .”). 
 3. ME. CONST. art. I, § 20; U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
 4. See State v. Anton, 463 A.2d 703, 709 (Me. 1983); see also Dir. of Bureau of Lab. Standards v. 
Fort Halifax Packing Co., 510 A.2d 1054, 1063 (Me. 1986). 
 5. Fort Halifax Packing, 510 A.2d at 1063 (emphasis omitted).  
 6. 463 A.2d 703 (Me. 1983). 
 7. Id. at 708. 
 8. 510 A.2d at 1054. 
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trial in these circumstances.9 
In City of Portland v. DePaolo10 in 1987, the Law Court abruptly reversed 
course, departing from the interpretation of Article I, Section 20 it used in Anton and 
Fort Halifax Packing.11  The court stated, “In language plain and broad, [A]rticle I, 
[S]ection 20 guarantees to parties in all civil suits the right to a jury trial, except 
whereby the common law and Massachusetts statutory law that existed prior to the 
adoption of the Maine Constitution in 1820 such cases were decided without a 
jury.”12  Under this interpretation of the Article I, Section 20 exception, the court 
held that the defendant had a right to a jury trial in an action involving violation of 
the City of Portland’s anti-pornography ordinance, a cause of action that did not exist 
at common law.13  With minimal analysis or explanation of the significant departure 
from its previous interpretation, the court broadened the right to a civil jury trial 
under the Maine Constitution considerably, beyond the scope of the federal right 
under the Seventh Amendment.  The court’s correction in DePaolo properly 
interprets the plain text of Article I, Section 20 and reflects Maine’s longstanding 
commitment to the civil jury trial. 
The challenge in determining whether there is a jury trial right under Article I, 
Section 20 is that intensive research and historical analysis must be undertaken 
separately for each type of action.  To determine the jury trial right for each type of 
action, a party must put forth an argument based on historical research into 
Massachusetts’s statutory law and common law prior to the adoption of the Maine 
Constitution in 1820.14  Under the DePaolo interpretation, the analysis can be even 
more complex.  For actions that did not exist at common law, the law requires that 
one must first examine “suits of the same general nature” in 1820 to determine 
whether the action was decided without a jury at the time.15  This analysis is 
frequently time-intensive, and may be prohibitively time-consuming when being 
conducted to determine whether there is a jury trial right for an action that will not 
typically drive large legal fees, for example, in a small claims case or a Forcible 
Entry and Detainer (FED) action.  
As evidenced by the interpretation of the civil jury trial right under the Maine 
Constitution, which was upheld for many years, state courts often substitute the well-
settled interpretation of United States constitutional provisions for the independent 
interpretation of the language of state constitutions.  In some states, this can be 
attributed to limited judicial resources, as well as the abundance of federal case law 
that exists on each constitutional provision.  But especially for provisions of the 
United States Constitution that the states have not incorporated, such as the Seventh 
                                                                                                     
 9. Id. at 1063. 
 10. 531 A.2d 669 (Me. 1987). 
 11. The court did not reference its departure from precedential interpretation of the exception in 
Article 1, Section 20.  It only stated “[t]he unmistakable import of [the exception] obviates resort either 
to nice semantic distinctions or to wooden interpretative principles.” Id. at 670.   
 12. Id.  
 13. Id. at 671. 
 14. See N. Sch. Congregate Hous. v. Merrithew, 558 A.2d 1189, 1190 (Me. 1989). 
 15. Id.; see also In re Shane T., 544 A.2d 1295, 1297 (Me. 1988) (“Since prior to 1820 suits of the 
same general nature as the present action fell within the jurisdiction of the chancery courts and were not 
tried to a jury . . . .”). 
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Amendment,16 the judiciary is in error in substituting the federal constitutional 
provision for that of the state.  In substituting the Court’s interpretation of the 
Seventh Amendment for the proper interpretation of Article I, Section 20 of the 
Maine Constitution, the Law Court overlooked the Maine Constitution, and in 
essence, assumed incorporation where it does not exist.  The court’s correction in 
DePaolo not only broadened the right to a civil jury trial under Maine law, but also 
reclaimed the power of the Maine Constitution in determining the legal rights of 
Maine citizens. 
This Comment will first undertake a historical survey of the right to a civil jury 
trial under the Maine Constitution, as it has been both narrowed and broadened by 
the Law Court’s interpretation of Article I, Section 20 over the years.17  Next, this 
Comment will analyze the right to a jury trial in several common civil actions under 
the court’s corrected interpretation of Article I, Section 20.   Finally, this Comment 
will argue that the court’s reversal of its interpretation of the provision in Anton was 
the proper legal outcome for several reasons, including honoring the plain meaning 
of the Maine Constitution’s text, mitigating unequal outcomes, promoting judicial 
consistency, and treating the Maine Constitution as worthy of interpretation distinct 
from that of the Federal Constitution.  
II.  A HISTORICAL SURVEY OF THE CIVIL JURY TRIAL RIGHT UNDER THE MAINE 
CONSTITUTION 
A.  An Introduction to the Civil Jury Trial Right 
The right to a civil jury trial has long been considered a cornerstone of the 
American legal system.18  While there has been heated debate among academics and 
lawyers in recent decades on whether the civil jury trial right in America benefits the 
judicial system or leads to fairer outcomes,19 the right to be judged by one’s peers 
                                                                                                     
 16. In 1916, the Supreme Court held in Bombolis that the Seventh Amendment right to a civil jury is 
not incorporated to the states. 241 U.S. 211, 217 (1916). 
 17. Although there is a long history of both judicial and legislative recognition of a broad jury trial 
right in Maine, the right has not been held static over time.  At various points in Maine’s history, the 
Legislature and the drafters of the Maine Rules of Court have also narrowed the right to a civil jury trial 
for specific claims of action by statute or court rule, respectively.  For example, in 1976, District Court 
Rule 80H, which granted concurrent jurisdiction to the Superior Court in civil violations proceedings, 
became effective.  This rule was amended in 1977 to prohibit the removal of civil violation proceedings 
from the District Court to the Superior Court. Rule 80H, read in conjunction with former M.D.C. CIV. R. 
73, which restricted appeals to questions of law, eliminated the right to a jury trial on civil violations. See 
Gerald F. Petruccelli & John D. McKay, The Right to Jury Trial Under the Maine Constitution, 1. ME. B. 
J. 240, 242-43 (1986).  The Law Court held in DePaolo that these two rules were unenforceable in actions 
in which there is a constitutional right to a jury trial under Article I, Section 20. 531 A.2d 669, 671 (Me. 
1987).  The Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts and the Superior Courts have since been 
abrogated by the Maine Rules of Civil Procedure, which contain no provisions limiting the right to a jury 
trial.  This paper will mainly analyze the Law Court’s decisions that have narrowed and broadened the 
civil jury trial right; actions by the Legislature and the drafters of the Maine Rules of Court are largely 
beyond its scope. 
 18. Paul D. Carrington, The Civil Jury and American Democracy, 13 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 79, 
79 (2003). 
 19. The debate on the value of the civil jury trial has been the subject of many scholarly legal articles 
and books.  Proponents of the right, including Paul Carrington, cite several key reasons for its importance, 
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has consistently been considered a fundamental element of American democracy 
throughout history.  The use of juries in civil cases can be traced back to eleventh 
century England, when “petty juries” sat in the common law courts administered by 
the royal judges sent from Westminster to “bring the king’s law to every shire of the 
realm.”20  In Dimick v. Schiedt,21 the United States Supreme Court elucidated the 
centrality and importance of the jury trial to American civil procedure:   
[T]rial by jury has always been, and still is, generally regarded as the normal and 
preferable mode of disposing of issues of fact in civil cases at law as well as in 
criminal cases. Maintenance of the jury as a fact-finding body is of such importance 
and occupies so firm a place in our history and jurisprudence that any seeming 
curtailment of the right to a jury trial should be scrutinized with the utmost care.22 
The civil jury trial right became increasingly important to American colonists in 
the eighteenth century, as tensions grew between the colonists and the royal judges 
sent from England to preside over controversies.23  Although each state adopted 
different constitutional language on the right to a jury trial, the tradition of a 
constitutional right to a jury in both civil and criminal cases was reflected in all 
eleven state constitutions ratified before 1787.24  
Whether to include the right to a civil jury trial was of significant controversy 
during the framing of the Federal Constitution.  The inclusion of such a right was of 
high priority for Anti-federalists,25 but was ultimately omitted as a key element of 
compromise.26  One reason for its omission was that different existing practices 
among the states would make framing a general rule difficult.27  However, the 
ratification of the Seventh Amendment28 in 1791 reflected the continued widespread 
belief that the jury is an important element of our political process and a key 
                                                                                                     
including serving as an important check on the judiciary. Id. at 89; see also Victoria A. Farrar-Myers & 
Jason B. Myers, Echoes of the Founding: The Jury in Civil Cases as Conferrer of Legitimacy, 54 SMU L. 
REV. 1857, 1858 (2001).  Additionally, Carrington claims the right to a civil jury “imparts structural 
rigidity to civil procedure that is not encountered in other legal systems.” Carrington, supra note 18, at 
91.  In contrast, Jerome Frank argues that “the single greatest obstacle to effective fact-finding” is the 
jury, because juries are “stupid, ill-informed, swayed by emotion and prejudice, indifferent to legal rules, 
and unscientific in reaching verdicts.” JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN 
AMERICAN JUSTICE 8-9 (1973). 
 20. Carrington, supra note 18, at 80. 
 21. 293 U.S. 474, 485 (1935). 
 22. Id. at 485-86. 
 23. Carrington, supra note 18, at 82. 
 24. Id. at 83. 
 25. The Anti-federalists viewed the jury as an important check on power of the federal government, 
and a safeguard against corruption.  Specifically, the Anti-federalists viewed the jury as an additional 
separation of power, but one within the judicial branch. See Carrington, supra note 18, at 84-85. 
 26. Id.  
 27. Lisa S. Meyer, Taking the "Complexity" Out of Complex Litigation: Preserving the Constitutional 
Right to a Civil Jury Trial, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 337, 342-43 (1993). 
 28. The Seventh Amendment provides:  
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by 
jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the 
United States, than according to the rules of the common law. 
U.S. CONST. amend. VII.  
174 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:1 
safeguard against the power of the judiciary.29 
The Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Seventh Amendment has been fairly 
consistent, with one scholar arguing that it “has been interpreted as if it were virtually 
a self-explanatory provision.”30  Since Justice Story’s interpretation of the Seventh 
Amendment in United States v. Wonson,31 the United States Supreme Court has 
interpreted the amendment to include two key features.  First, the right to a civil jury 
trial is determined by examining English common law in 1791, not by looking to the 
present-day laws of the United States.32  Second, the determination is made by 
“render[ing] . . . the common law of England temporally static, for the matured 
doctrine also required that the view of English law be taken as of the date of the 
adoption of the Seventh Amendment in 1791.”33  Hence, the language of the Seventh 
Amendment, as interpreted by the Court, creates a narrower federal right to a civil 
jury trial than is available under the language of Article I, Section 20 of the Maine 
Constitution.34      
Although the Supreme Court has been consistent in its interpretation of the 
Seventh Amendment, it is one of three amendments to the Constitution that have not 
been incorporated to the states, and there is significant variation in the civil jury trial 
right offered under state constitutions.  The majority of the Bill of Rights has been 
incorporated through the theory of selective incorporation, under which the Supreme 
Court analyzes whether the particular protection is “fundamental to our Nation’s 
particular scheme of ordered liberty and system of justice.”35  Upon the Court’s 
determination that a protection is fundamental, it is incorporated to the states under 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.36  Although the Supreme 
Court’s rationale for failing to incorporate the Seventh Amendment to the states is 
somewhat cloudy, the Court has maintained its position on this issue since its 1875 
decision in Walker v. Sauvinet.37 
Despite the lack of incorporation of the Seventh Amendment to the states, the 
majority of states voluntarily maintain a right to a civil jury trial equivalent to that 
provided by the Seventh Amendment. 38  Today, forty-nine of fifty states provide 
civil litigants with some right to a jury, either through constitutional provision, state 
statute, or common law decision.39  Colorado is the only state that does not recognize 
                                                                                                     
 29. Carrington, supra note 18, at 83.  
 30. Charles W. Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the Seventh Amendment, 57 MINN. L. REV. 
639, 639 (1973).  
 31. 28 F.Cas. 745, 750 (C.C.D. Mass. 1812) (No. 16,750). 
 32. Wolfram, supra note 30, at 641-42. 
 33. Id. 
 34. MARSHALL J. TINKLE, THE MAINE STATE CONSTITUTION 59 (2d ed. 2013). 
 35. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 763-64 (2010). 
 36. Id. at 759.   
 37. See id. at 765 n.13 (“Our governing decisions regarding the . . . Seventh Amendment’s civil jury 
trial requirement long predate the era of selective incorporation.”); Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90, 92 
(1875) (holding that due process does not necessarily require a jury trial so long as “the trial is had 
according to the settled course of judicial proceedings.”). 
 38. TED A. DONNER & RICHARD K. GABRIEL, JURY SELECTION STRATEGY AND SCIENCE § 35:2 (3d 
ed. 2015). 
 39. Id.  
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a right to a civil jury trial.40  In Connecticut, “[t]he constitutional prohibition on the 
abridgment of the jury trial right historically has been interpreted to apply, not in all 
possible instances, but only in those cases for which the right existed when the 
constitution was adopted.”41  In many states, because the right to a jury trial in civil 
cases only exists for actions that held that right at common law, determining whether 
a right exists today requires a historical analysis, just as it does under the Seventh 
Amendment.   
In addition to the variations in the language of civil jury trial rights offered under 
different state constitutions, the methods used by state courts to interpret the right 
vary as well.  State courts have the final authority to interpret state constitutions.42  
In doing so, courts generally use one of three methodologies to interpret a state 
constitutional provision in relation to federal constitutional law: the lockstep 
approach, the criteria approach, and the primacy approach.43  The lockstep approach, 
in which the state court looks only to the interpretation of the federal constitutional 
provision in determining the meaning of the state constitution, was frequently used 
in the middle part of the twentieth century, and, in many cases, rendered state 
constitutional provisions completely ineffectual.44  Some argue that “the lockstep 
approach remains the most common approach to state constitutionalism.”45 
However, in the late 1970s, after a period of expansion of federal constitutional 
law, the importance of state constitutions in protecting the rights of state citizens was 
brought to light in a Harvard Law Review article written by Justice Brennan.46  Often 
referred to as “New Judicial Federalism,”47 Brennan’s call to revitalize state 
constitutional law relies on the premise that state courts must broadly interpret state 
constitutional guarantees.48  
 The two methodologies of interpretation that align with new judicial federalist 
principles are the criteria approach and the primacy approach.  Under the criteria 
approach, the courts use several criteria to determine whether the state constitutional 
provision allows broader protection, warranting deviating from the federal 
constitutional interpretation.49  Although the criteria used by different courts vary 
under this approach, one criterion commonly used by the court is whether the text of 
                                                                                                     
 40. Id.; see also Firelock Inc. v. District Court, 776 P.2d 1090, 1097 (Colo. 1989) (en banc) (clarifying 
that “there is no constitutional right to a jury trial in civil cases” in Colorado).   
 41. Gentile v. Altermatt, 363 A.2d 1, 17 (Conn. 1975) (citing La Croix v. County Comm’rs, 50 Conn. 
321, 327 (1882)). 
 42. Lawrence Friedman, The Constitutional Value of Dialogue and the New Judicial Federalism, 28 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 93, 101 (2000); see generally William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the 
Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977). 
 43. Friedman, supra note 42, at 105. 
 44. Id. at 102. 
 45. Robert K. Fitzpatrick, Note, Neither Icarus Nor Ostrich: State Constitutions as an Independent 
Source of Individual Rights, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1833, 1850 (2004). 
 46. Brennan, supra note 42. 
 47. “New judicial federalism” has been the topic of much scholarly writing since Justice Brennan’s 
introduction of the concept in 1977. See, e.g., David Schuman, A Failed Critique of State 
Constitutionalism, 91 MICH. L. REV. 274, 280 (1992); see also Fitzpatrick, supra note 45, at 1850.  This 
Comment will not attempt to explore the nuances of this vast area of state constitutional law.   
 48. Joseph Blocher, What State Constitutional Law Can Tell Us About the Federal Constitution, 115 
PENN ST. L. REV. 1035, 1037 (2011). 
 49. Friedman, supra note 42, at 104. 
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the state constitutional provision “differs significantly from its federal 
counterpart.”50  Other criteria can include “[the] legislative history of the state 
constitutional provision; . . . preexisting state law, . . . [and] state traditions, which 
may emphasize greater protections for individual rights . . . .”51 
In contrast to the criteria approach, which judges use to determine when a 
deviation from the interpretation of its federal counterpart is warranted, the primacy 
approach interprets the state constitutional provision independently of the federal 
provision.52  The court assumes that the state constitution guarantees significant 
rights to its citizens, and then determines the scope of those rights by using standard 
tools of statutory interpretation, such as examining the language of the provision and 
considering prior interpretations of the provision by the state courts.53  State courts 
have used all three approaches to interpret the language of various state constitutional 
provisions.  As this Comment will discuss in depth, the Law Court has used both the 
“lockstepping" method of interpretation as well as the primary approach to arrive at 
very different interpretations of the right to a civil jury trial under the Maine 
Constitution. 
B.  The Civil Jury Trial Right Under the Maine Constitution 
Article I, Section 20 of the Declaration of Rights of the Maine Constitution 
promises a broader right to a civil jury trial than is offered by many states.  Its 
language has been consistent since the ratification of the Declaration of Rights of the 
Maine Constitution in 1820, and has guaranteed an affirmative right to a civil jury 
trial.54  The provision states, “In all civil suits, and in all controversies concerning 
property, the parties shall have a right to a trial by jury, except in cases where it has 
heretofore been otherwise practiced; the party claiming the right may be heard by 
himself or herself and with counsel, or either, at the election of the party.”55  This 
provision derived from Article XV of the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, which 
stated in part, “In all controversies concerning property, and in all suits between two 
or more persons, except in cases in which it has heretofore been otherways used and 
practised, the parties have a right to a trial by jury . . . .”56  As the Law Court stated 
in Farnsworth v. Whiting,57 the Maine provision “is in all substantial particulars the 
same as that of Massachusetts.”58  
Unlike the Seventh Amendment, which has been interpreted to refer exclusively 
to a jury trial right under English common law, the right to a jury trial under Article 
I, Section 20 relies on historical state law, as nearly thirty years of Massachusetts 
law existed at the time of the ratification of the Maine Constitution.59  However, the 
roots of the English common law system still influence its scope.  For example, as 
                                                                                                     
 50. Id. at 104-05. 
 51. Id. at 105. 
 52. Id. at 106. 
 53. Id. at 106-07. 
 54. ME. CONST. art. I, § 20.   
 55. Id. 
 56. MASS. CONST. of 1780, Part the First, art. XV. 
 57. 106 Me. 430, 76 A. 909 (1910). 
 58. Id. at 911.  
 59. TINKLE, supra note 34, at 59. 
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the Law Court held in its decision in Farnsworth in 1910,60 the right to a civil jury 
trial is a common law right, which is not extended to suits at equity.61 
Like the Seventh Amendment, Article I, Section 20 of the Maine Constitution 
requires a historical analysis of the legal system in place at the time of its adoption 
in 1820 to determine whether a current jury trial right exists for a specific action.  
But in contrast with the analysis required under the Seventh Amendment and the 
state constitutions that mirror it, the historical analysis required to determine whether 
there is a present-day right to a jury trial for a particular action under the Maine 
Constitution is more complex.  The historical analysis requires several layers of 
inquiry, including comparisons between present-day actions, such as license 
revocations, to actions “similar in nature” at common law.62  The opportunity to 
conduct such an analysis has simply not arisen for each type of civil action in the 
Maine courts because it is uncommon for a litigant to request a jury trial in the first 
place, 63 and even less common for a litigant to appeal a decision based on the fact 
that a request for a jury trial was denied. 
C.  The Maine Supreme Court’s Interpretation of  
Article I, Section 20 Before State v. Anton 
Article I, Section 20 of the Maine Constitution promises a broader right to a jury 
trial than does the U.S. Constitution.64  Rather than only offering a right to a jury trial 
in actions that held that right at common law, the provision protects the right to a 
jury trial as long as the type of action in question does not fall within the exceptions 
noted in Article I, Section 20.  The Law Court first interpreted Article I, Section 20 
in Farnsworth in 1910.65  In Farnsworth, the administratrix of an estate sued for the 
return of articles of personal property that had belonged to the decedent.66  The court 
held that the action was equitable in nature, and would have been heard in the 
chancery court at common law.67  Thus, the cause of action fell firmly into the 
exception noted in Article I, Section 20, and no jury trial right existed.68  
                                                                                                     
 60. 106 Me. at 430, 76 A. at 911 (holding “[t]he article as it now stands is a declaration of the common 
law right to a trial by jury, and in no way inconsistent with the establishment of a court of chancery having 
general jurisdiction, as it was at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, and proceeding in accordance 
with its fundamental rules of practice as then existing.”); see also Portland Pipe Line Corp. v. Envtl. 
Improvement Comm’n, 307 A.2d 1 (Me. 1973).   
 61. Suits at equity are proceedings in which the remedy sought is not monetary compensation, but 
instead is some other sort of special remedy by the court, such as an injunction. See TINKLE, supra note 
34, at 60.  The origin of these proceedings is English common law, which had both courts of law and 
courts of equity (also known as chancery courts).  Courts of law had jurisdiction over “actions at law,” 
while courts of equity had jurisdiction over suits in equity.    
 62. See N. Sch. Congregate Hous. v. Merrithew, 558 A.2d 1189, 1190 (Me. 1989). 
 63. Although statistics on how many civil litigants request jury trials are not available in Maine, data 
show that only three to four percent of cases were resolved through a jury trial in Maine in 2004. See 
KENNETH T. PALMER ET AL., MAINE POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT 104 (2d ed. 2009).  However, Palmer 
suggests that the number of jury trials in Maine has stayed fairly constant in recent years, which goes 
against the national trend of a reduction of in the number of jury trials used to resolve civil disputes. Id.   
 64. See TINKLE, supra note 34, at 59. 
 65. 106 Me. at 430, 76 A. at 909. 
 66. Id., 76 A. at 910. 
 67. Id., 76 A. at 911. 
 68. Id., 76 A. at 911.  
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After Farnsworth, the Law Court continued to interpret the exception in a 
manner consistent with the provision’s text, although the next Article I, Section 20 
case did not arise for almost sixty years.69  Portland Pipe Line Corp. v. Envtl. 
Improvement Comm’n,70 decided in 1973, concerned the plaintiffs’ right to a jury 
trial to determine third-party damages under the Oil Discharge Prevention and 
Pollution Control Act of 1970, which required damages to be determined by 
arbitration conducted by an administrative body.71  The court held that at common 
law, “the Legislature directed the County Commissioners to determine the flowage 
damages and report to the Court.”72  The report was subject to impeachment by a 
jury, but was not originally determined by a jury, and therefore no right to a formal 
jury trial attached to damage to real property.73  Additionally, the court cited to an 
early case concerning damage to real property under the Mill Act, in which the court 
determined that the suit was at equity, and therefore held no jury trial right under 
Article I, Section 20.74   
In its 1979 decision in Cyr v. Cote,75 the Law Court was consistent in its 
interpretation of the provision, stating, “Our constitutional provision safeguards the 
right to a jury trial on all legal claims.”76  The court properly differentiated between 
legal and equitable claims to determine whether the exception applied, 
acknowledging, “To determine the often elusive question of whether a claim is legal 
or equitable, there must be an appraisal of the basic nature of this issue presented, 
including the relief sought.”77  The court implicitly distinguished Cyr from 
Farnsworth, reasoning that although both cases involved estates, the cause of action 
in Cyr contained broader legal issues, including undue influence, duress, and lack of 
capacity.78  The Cyr court concluded that the cause of action as a whole was legal in 
nature, and therefore held an affirmative right to a jury trial exists in such actions.79 
D.  The Law Court’s Incorrect Interpretation under State v. Anton 
After almost 100 years of interpreting Article I, Section 20 in a manner 
consistent with its text, the Law Court made an about-face, applying a dichotomous 
interpretation and narrowing the jury trial right protected by the Maine Constitution.  
In 1983, the Law Court significantly constricted the right to a civil jury trial in its 
erroneous interpretation of Article I, Section 20 in State v. Anton.80  The court’s 
reasoning for its departure from the long-held guarantee of a broad right to a jury 
trial may have been driven by several factors, including an undercurrent of judicial 
                                                                                                     
 69. See Thad B. Zmistowski, Note, City of Portland v. DePaolo: Defining the Role of Stare Decisis 
in State Constitutional Decisionmaking, 41 ME. L. REV. 201, 205 (1989).   
 70. 307 A.2d 1 (Me. 1973). 
 71. Id. at 10. 
 72. Id. at 28. 
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 74. Id. 
 75. 396 A.2d 1013, 1016 (Me. 1979). 
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expediency, a desire to protect administrative procedural process, as well as the 
court’s willingness to substitute federal constitutional interpretation for proper 
interpretation of Maine’s own constitution. The confluence of these factors likely led 
to the Law Court’s illogical, somewhat tortured analysis used to arrive at the 
conclusion that Article I, Section 20 does not include the right to a jury trial for a 
defendant charged with a speeding violation.81 
In Anton, two defendants in two separate cases were charged with exceeding the 
speed limit in violation of Maine statutory law.82  Each defendant requested his case 
be transferred from the District Court, where the case was filed, to the Superior Court 
for a jury trial.83  The District Court denied both motions, found each defendant 
responsible for committing the traffic violation, and imposed a fine.84  Each 
defendant appealed to the Superior Court in his respective county.85  The 
Cumberland County Superior Court affirmed the District Court’s denial of a jury 
trial, while York County reversed, ordering that the case “remain on the civil docket 
of the Superior Court for further proceedings.”86  Both cases were brought to the Law 
Court on appeal, where they were combined under the same issue: whether 
defendants had a right to a jury trial in a traffic infraction proceeding.87  
In its decision, the Law Court first held that a traffic infraction—with a possible 
penalty of license revocation—did not constitute a criminal violation for which a 
jury trial would be guaranteed under Article I, Section 7 of the Maine Constitution.88  
Defendants argued that even if the court deemed the infraction a civil violation, their 
right to a civil jury trial was preserved under Article 1, Section 20.89  In response to 
defendants’ argument, the court stated: “That provision, substantially similar to 
Article 15 of the Declaration of Rights in the Massachusetts Constitution, preserves 
the right to jury trial in civil actions where that right existed when the Maine 
Constitution was adopted.”90  The court cited to only one case following this 
interpretation, the case of State v. Sklar,91 which does not reference the right to a civil 
jury trial, but only the right to a criminal jury trial under Article I, Section 7.92  
The court went on to state: “The provision does not apply to suits in equity or 
other civil proceedings not then tried by jury in the common law courts,”93 citing five 
                                                                                                     
 81. Id. at 708-09. 
 82. Id. at 704.  The statute in question was 29 M.R.S.A. § 1251 (Supp. 1982), repealed by P.L. 1993, 
ch. 683 (effective Apr. 14, 1994).  
 83. Anton, 463 A.2d at 704. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 705 (internal citation omitted). 
 87. Id. at 704. 
 88. Id. at 706-08. The Law Court considered factors including the severity of the potential penalties, 
as well as the nature of the infraction, in determining that the violation was not criminal in nature.  
 89. Id. at 708. 
 90. Id. 
 91. 317 A.2d 160 (Me. 1974). 
 92. Id. at 169-71. 
 93. Anton, 463 A.2d at 708. 
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cases94 and one judicial opinion95 in Maine and Massachusetts in which the right to 
a civil jury trial was in question.  The court was partly right.  It has long been held 
that no right to a jury trial exists in actions at equity, because equity courts did not 
include juries at common law.96  For example, in Portland Pipe Line, the court held 
there to be no Constitutional right to a civil jury trial for damages caused to property 
owners from the construction of a dam, because the action was closest to an eminent 
domain proceeding, which is a proceeding at equity.97  However, the Anton court’s 
conclusion that the right to a jury trial does not apply to “other civil proceedings not 
then tried by jury in the common law courts”98 was incorrect.  The court incorrectly 
interpreted the cases it cited to exclude the right to a jury trial in actions unknown at 
common law.  None of the five cases cited interpreted Article I, Section 20 to prohibit 
the right to a jury trial in actions that did not exist at common law.  Two of the cited 
cases concerned actions at equity, which do not hold a jury trial right.99  One involved 
an action determined by a proceeding other than a jury trial prior to 1820, precluding 
the common law right to a jury trial today.100  Finally, two of the actions were 
determined to be outside the right to a jury trial as defined by the Massachusetts 
Constitution, which contains an exception to the jury trial right for actions at equity 
at common law similar to that provided in the Maine Constitution.101 
Based on its improper interpretation and analysis of precedent under 
Massachusetts and Maine law, the court in Anton concluded that there is no right to 
a jury trial in traffic infraction proceedings, reasoning “[w]e are aware of no civil 
suit in 1819 that would have been comparable to such a proceeding.”102  The court’s 
interpretation of Article I, Section 20 in Anton was in direct contradiction to the plain 
text of the provision.  The implications of this incorrect interpretation of the text are 
significant. By putting forth this interpretation, the Law Court narrowed the right to 
                                                                                                     
 94. Id. at 708-09.  The Anton court cited the following cases in holding no right to a civil jury trial 
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Envtl. Improvement Comm’n, 307 A.2d 1, 28 (Me. 1973); Farnsworth v. Whiting, 106 Me. 430, 76 A. 
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proceedings); cf. Ashley v. Wait, 116 N.E. 961 (Mass. 1917) (no jury trial for petition under corrupt 
practices act); Attorney General v. Sullivan, 40 N.E. 843 (Mass. 1895) (no jury trial in quo warrants 
proceeding to try title to political office).  
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court, upheld Maine’s workers’ compensation law as constitutional, reasoning that participation was 
elective between employer and employee, and the law did not interfere with the right to a jury trial under 
Article I, Section 20.   
 96. See Farnsworth, 106 Me. at 430, 76 A. at 911. 
 97. 307 A.2d at 28. 
 98. Anton, 463 A.2d at 708. 
 99. Portland Pipe Line, 307 A.2d at 29 (a civil action is equitable in nature, and does not hold a 
common law right to a civil jury trial under Article 1, Section 20); see also Farnsworth, 106 Me. at 430, 
76 A. at 911. 
 100. See Kennebec Water Dist. v. City of Waterville, 96 Me. 234, 234, 52 A. 774, 780 (1902) (holding 
that a proceeding for assessing the amount of just compensation for private property taken for public uses 
is not a civil suit, but a ‘proceeding in rem’). 
 101. See Ashley, 228 Mass. 63, 80, 116 N.E. 961, 967 (1917) (no jury trial for petition under corrupt 
practices act because public office is not “property” within the definition of “suits concerning property”); 
Sullivan, 163 Mass. 446, 451, 40 N.E. 843, 846 (1895) (one’s right to public office is not a controversy 
concerning property, so no jury trial right exists).  
 102. Anton, 463 A.2d at 709. 
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a jury trial to apply only to actions that existed prior to the adoption of the Maine 
Constitution in 1820.  The court further limited the jury trial right by shifting the 
burden of proof to the defendant to identify a “suit of a similar nature” that held the 
right to a jury trial at common law.103  Given the complex research and analysis 
required to determine whether a jury trial right existed for a particular type of action 
at common law, placing the burden of proof on the defendant created a significant 
barrier to access to a jury trial in certain civil actions.   
The court’s precise rationale for its abrupt departure from over one hundred 
years of precedent104 is impossible to determine, in part due to the lack of any logical 
justification contained in the Anton decision itself.  However, several factors may 
have influenced the court’s decision to interpret Article I, Section 20 in a manner 
contrary to the text of the provision, well-established precedent, and a judicial culture 
in Maine that had rigorously upheld the right to a jury trial for decades.105  
 The decision may have been influenced by a desire for judicial efficiency, 
especially given the roles and responsibilities of the District and Superior Courts in 
Maine. The Maine Superior Court is the only court able to conduct jury trials. 
Therefore, narrowing the constitutional right to a jury trial in civil cases can limit 
overburdening the Superior Court.106  The court alluded to this concern in its tone at 
one point in Anton, where Justice Godfrey stated, “[w]e are concerned here with an 
entire system for disposition of traffic infractions that requires the District Court 
judge first to determine a defendant’s liability and then either impose a civil fine 
within prescribed limits or suspend defendant’s operator’s license.”107  His statement 
implied that defendants’ claim of a jury trial right would disrupt the entire system 
that has been put into place to allow the District Court to decide traffic infractions.   
 The court’s decision to go against precedent in Anton was likely made easier by 
the prevalence of state courts across the nation substituting federal constitutional 
interpretation for proper interpretation of state constitutional provisions.108  This 
phenomenon, known as “lockstepping,” is a common method of state constitutional 
analysis today, but was even more pervasive at the time of the Anton decision.109  By 
borrowing the accepted interpretation of the Seventh Amendment and applying it to 
Article I, Section 20 of the Maine Constitution, the court effectively narrowed the 
civil jury trial right while maintaining an appearance of legitimacy in its 
interpretation.  
Anton was controlling precedent for four years.  But even under Anton, the court 
sometimes found in favor of a jury trial if the party requesting the jury could prove 
such a right existed at common law. For example, in Ela v. Pelletier,110 a unanimous 
court held that the Maine small claims procedure was unconstitutional as it infringed 
                                                                                                     
 103. Id. (stating “[defendants] cite no authority for the proposition that a comparable civil suit by the 
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 104. Petruccelli & McKay, supra note 17, at 246. 
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on the right to a jury trial in a small claims action.111  In its analysis, the court quoted 
Anton, stating “[t]his provision ‘preserves the right to a jury trial in civil actions 
where that right existed when the Maine Constitution was adopted.”112  Because a 
small claims action was heard by a jury under Massachusetts statute prior to 1820, 
Ela’s action was considered “of a kind that was heard and determined by a common 
law court with a right to a jury trial prior to the adoption of the Maine 
Constitution.”113 Thus, the court upheld the right to a jury trial for small claims 
actions under the Anton interpretation.114  Although small claims actions fell within 
the narrower right to a civil jury trial under the Anton interpretation, the fact that the 
court did not take the opportunity to correct this interpretation in Ela helped to 
cement the incorrect interpretation further.   
Perhaps of greater significance was the Law Court’s exclusion of the right to a 
jury trial for an action that did not exist at common law in Dir. of Bureau of Labor 
Standards v. Fort Halifax Packing Co.115 in 1986.  In this case, the court used the 
Anton interpretation to determine whether an action to collect severance pay under 
Maine statute has a right to a jury trial.116  The Law Court quoted Anton extensively 
in its decision: 
When a new type of statutory action is created, the existence of a constitutional right 
to jury trial under [A]rticle I, [S]ection 20 depends on the nature of the action. If it 
is a kind that was heard and determined by a common law court with a right to jury 
trial prior to adoption of the Maine Constitution, then [A]rticle I, [S]ection 20 
guarantees that right today.117 
Using this reasoning, the Law Court concluded that there is no jury trial 
available in an action to recover severance pay under Maine statute, because there 
was no such action at common law.118  The Law Court upheld the Superior Court’s 
denial of defendant’s request for a trial by jury,119 further narrowing the civil jury 
trial right under the Anton interpretation. 
E.  The Reversal of the Anton Interpretation in City of Portland v. Depaolo 
Four years after Anton, the Law Court abruptly reversed its interpretation of 
Article I, Section 20 in City of Portland v. DePaolo, restoring the provision’s 
guarantee of a broad right to a civil jury trial.120  In DePaolo, defendants were 
assessed civil penalties in the District Court for violating the City of Portland’s anti-
pornography ordinance for selling obscene magazines to undercover police 
officers.121  Defendants requested removal of the case to the Superior Court for a jury 
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trial, but their request was denied.122 One of the questions on appeal to the Law Court 
was whether defendants had the right to a jury trial for the violation of a civil 
ordinance under Article I, Section 20.123 The Law Court did not reference Anton124 
at any point in its interpretation of the provision, which stated:  
The unmistakable import of [the Article I, Section 20 exception] obviates resort 
either to nice semantic distinctions or to wooden interpretative principles.  In 
language plain and broad[,] [A]rticle I, [S]ection 20 guarantees to parties in all civil 
suits the right to a jury trial, except where by the common law and Massachusetts 
statutory law that existed prior to the adoption of the Maine Constitution in 1820 
such cases were decided without a jury.125 
In its affirmative interpretation of the Article I, Section 20 exception, the 
DePaolo court cited to several of the very cases incorrectly interpreted in Anton, 
including Farnsworth, Portland Pipeline, and Kennebec Water District.126  
However, the court did not explicitly overrule Anton or address the reversal of its 
interpretation of Article I, Section 20 under Anton.127  The DePaolo court simply 
stated that there was a “broad constitutional guarantee of the right to a jury trial in 
all civil cases” granted by Article I, Section 20.128  Without explanation for its about-
face, the court effectively reversed its earlier narrowing of the civil jury trial right 
under the Maine Constitution.129  It held that the exception in Article I, Section 20 
did not apply to civil actions exclusively seeking a monetary recovery; therefore, 
defendants have a right to a jury trial in this case.130  Accordingly, the court vacated 
the decisions of the Superior Court and remanded it for a new trial.131 
The Law Court may have been influenced by an article by Gerald F. Petruccelli 
                                                                                                     
 122. Id. at 670. 
 123. Id. at 671. 
 124. The Law Court later acknowledged that “DePaolo overruled Anton without citing it.” Sirois v. 
Winslow, 585 A.2d 183, 188 (Me. 1991). 
 125. DePaolo, 531 A.2d at 670 (citing Portland Pipe Line Corp. v. Envtl. Improvement Comm’n., 307 
A.2d 1, 28 (Me. 1973); Farnsworth v. Whiting, 106 Me. 430, 76 A. 909 (1910); Kennebec Water Dist. v. 
City of Waterville, 96 Me. 234, 246–51, 52 A. 774, 779–81 (1902)).  
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id.  
 129. The Law Court was criticized for disregarding stare decisis when it ignored Anton in City of 
Portland v. DePaolo. Thad B. Zmistowski, Note, City of Portland v. DePaolo: Defining the Role of Stare 
Decisis in State Constitutional Decision-Making, 41. ME. L. REV. 201, 203 (1989).  The author observed: 
In reaching its decision, the Law Court made no mention of the Anton case.  Indeed, the 
only attempt the court made at confronting Anton consisted in two veiled references, one 
to “nice semantic distinctions [and] wooden interpretive principles,” and the other to 
“intimations and statements” in prior cases that were “incompatible with the broad view of 
the guarantee of a jury trial.”   
Id. (alteration in original). 
 130. DePaolo, 531 A.2d at 671.  
 131. Id.  In addition to the court’s restoration of the broad jury trial right through its proper 
interpretation of Article I, Section 20, the court further protected the constitutional right to a jury trial in 
DePaolo.  Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 80H(g), as amended in 1977, read in conjunction with former 
Maine District Court Civil Rule 73, which restricted appeals to questions of law, eliminated the right to a 
jury trial for civil violations. Id.  The DePaolo court held that to the extent Rule 80H(g) prohibits removal 
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and John D. McKay, “written largely in anticipation of the DePaolo case,”132 
published by the Maine Bar Journal in September 1986.133  The authors argued that 
the court in Anton went against both the “exceptionally rigorous” jury trial mandates 
of the Maine Constitution, as well as the plain text of Section 20.134  Regarding the 
court’s decision in Anton and the extension of the Anton interpretation to Fort 
Halifax Packing, the authors stated that:  
[T]he Law Court has vigilantly rejected expedient attempts to circumvent the 
constitutional guarantee of trial by jury.  If State v. Anton and Fort Halifax Packing 
hold otherwise they are not consistent with either the text of Section 20 or the 
considered opinions of the Law Court from 1821 to 1985.135  
The DePaolo interpretation of Article I, Section 20 was further solidified in the 
Law Court’s decision in North Sch. Congregate Hous. v. Merrithew in 1989.136  The 
question in Merrithew was whether there is a right to a jury trial for a tenant who has 
been evicted under Maine’s Forcible Entry and Detainer (FED) statute.137  The 
landlord in this case brought an FED action to the District Court, where jury trials 
were unavailable.138  In response, the defendant filed a motion to remove the FED 
action to the Superior Court.139  In its analysis, the court stated: 
We have recently modified how we analyze the constitutional right to a jury trial to 
track more closely the language of [A]rticle I, [S]ection 20.  Specifically, our 
practice now is to find that there is such a right unless it is affirmatively shown that 
a jury trial was unavailable in such a case in 1820.140 
The court undertook an in-depth historical analysis to conclude that FED actions 
have the right to a jury trial, because suits of a similar nature—actions of eviction—
had such a right prior to 1820, under both common law and Massachusetts statute.141   
The court in Merrithew went beyond its decision in DePaolo to further repair 
the right to a civil jury trial under Article I, Section 20 in two important ways. First, 
the Merrithew court stated that although the right to a jury trial for FED proceedings 
had been eliminated by statute with the creation of the modern district court in 1961, 
a jury was used under a Massachusetts statute at the time of the adoption of the Maine 
Constitution, as well as under Maine statute from 1824 to 1961.142  According to the 
court, the elimination of the right to a jury trial under the Maine District Court Rules 
from 1961 onward was in violation of the constitutional right to a jury trial in FED 
actions.143  The court declared the rules invalid to the extent they removed the right 
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to a jury trial for civil violations.144  Second, the court stated that a right to a civil 
jury trial exists “unless it is affirmatively shown that a jury trial was unavailable in 
such a case in 1820.”145 Thus, the Merrithew court shifted the burden from the party 
seeking a jury trial to the party opposing it.  Given the complexity of the analysis 
required to determine whether such right was available in 1820, the court’s burden-
shifting considerably strengthened the jury trial right. 
F.  The Outer Limits of the Depaolo Interpetation 
The court’s strengthening of the right to a civil jury trial under DePaolo soon 
led to an important question: how does this stronger right impact new remedies that 
did not exist at common law, such as administrative remedies and court procedures?  
The limits of the DePaolo interpretation of Article I, Section 20 were tested in Sirois 
v. Winslow in 1991.146  In this case, property owners filed a complaint with the 
Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) for damages sustained as the result 
of leaking gasoline tanks on a neighbor’s nearby property.147  The defendant filed a 
motion to dismiss the portion of the complaint regarding alleged damage to property, 
on the grounds that plaintiffs had filed a previous claim with the DEP’s 
administrative tribunal that “sought recovery for the same damages, and that the 
exclusivity provisions of the Acts . . . precluded the Superior Court action.”148  In 
response, the plaintiffs claimed they had a constitutional right to a jury trial to resolve 
the issues.149  The Superior Court granted the motion to dismiss, holding that the 
exclusivity provisions of the Acts in question did not violate plaintiffs’ right to a jury 
trial.150  The court reasoned that initially, plaintiffs had the option of choosing 
between an administrative hearing with the DEP and proceedings with the court, and 
plaintiffs chose the administrative remedy.151  Under the court’s rationale, the right 
to a jury trial was reserved to the plaintiffs only until they elected the administrative 
remedy, at which point the administrative remedy became the only remedy 
available.152   
Plaintiffs filed a motion for a report of the interlocutory ruling, challenging the 
Superior Court’s ruling on the issue of the plaintiff’s right to a jury trial in light of 
the administrative remedies available under the Acts.153  The motion was granted by 
the Superior Court.154  The Law Court denied the report of a question of law, 
concluding that the procedure is “an improper method for deciding the constitutional 
question presented,” as “[t]he plaintiffs have yet to establish by either the DEP 
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proceeding or the action in the Superior Court that the alleged contamination 
occurred or that Winslow was responsible for the contamination.”155  
The question at issue, which the court declined to weigh in on via advisory 
opinion, tests the strength of the civil jury trial right granted by Article I, Section 20 
under the DePaolo interpretation.  In his dissenting opinion, Justice Collins 
addressed this unanswered question: 
The question not answered by DePaolo, and raised here, is whether the language of 
[A]rticle I, [S]ection 20 also guarantees the right to a jury trial where the Legislature 
has crafted a new remedy that is not a “civil suit.”  What makes this question difficult 
is the language of the exception; the parties have a right to a jury trial “except in 
cases where it has heretofore been otherwise practiced.”  Does this clause prevent 
the Legislature from ever setting up a non-jury tribunal for any controversy that 
would have been settled by a common-law action prior to 1820?156 
If the answer to Justice Collins’s question is “yes,” the constitutionality of a 
significant body of legislation is called into question, including legislation such as 
the Workers’ Compensation Act.  In an earlier advisory opinion,157 the Maine 
Supreme Court had concluded that the Workers’ Compensation Act is constitutional 
under the Anton interpretation of Article I, Section 20.  The court reasoned that 
because employees did not have the right to workmen’s compensation under the law 
at the time the Constitution was adopted, the exclusion of a civil jury trial under the 
Workers’ Compensation Act was not in violation of Article I, Section 20.158  
Following DePaolo, the constitutionality of statutes that allow administrative bodies 
to preclude a jury from determining controversies would have to be upheld under 
another rationale. 
In his dissent, Justice Collins stated that applying DePaolo to administrative 
proceedings would be too restrictive in limiting the legislature’s ability to authorize 
administrative agencies to establish specialized proceedings creating “new remedies 
unknown to the common law.”159 His view aligns with the approach suggested by 
Petruccelli and McKay, who suggest that jury trial rights under Article I, Section 20 
should not be available for “newly established rights . . . or inherently administrative 
matters . . . properly assigned to administrative bodies.”160  Under Justice Collins’s 
view, DePaolo should not be applied to cases in which an administrative body is 
administering new remedies that were not available under the common law.161  
According to Justice Collins, the court should provide certainty to the legislature that 
new remedies created by statute are not in violation of the Maine Constitution in light 
of DePaolo, rather than declining to address the question.162 
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Although Justice Collins’s dissent is not controlling, it demonstrates the 
challenges faced by the judiciary in upholding a broad right to a jury trial under 
Article I, Section 20 of the Maine Constitution.  The strong right to a civil jury trial 
as promised under DePaolo could be a constitutional barrier to new remedies, such 
as those designed by administrative agencies.  The court has not addressed this issue 
to date, and has not amended its opinion on the constitutionality of the Workers’ 
Compensation Act under the DePaolo interpretation.163 
III.  THE CURRENT RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL IN CIVIL ACTIONS 
The constitutional right to a jury trial must be analyzed independently for each 
civil action. To determine whether a jury trial right exists for a particular action, one 
must first understand whether that cause of action existed at common law: for Maine, 
in or prior to 1820.  If the same cause of action existed at the time the Constitution 
was adopted, the next step required by the court is to determine whether the cause of 
action was granted a jury trial, or if [it] was handled in some other non-jury 
proceeding, such as a proceeding under equity jurisdiction.  If the cause of action did 
not exist at common law, the same analysis must be undertaken by assessing whether 
a “suit of a similar nature” was decided in a non-jury proceeding at the time.164  If no 
similar cause of action existed, there is an affirmative right to a jury trial under the 
DePaolo interpretation of Article I, Section 20.   
For several causes of action, the court has determined whether there is a right to 
a jury trial using an interpretation consistent with DePaolo.165  For the cases decided 
under Anton, the right to a jury trial would likely change under the DePaolo 
interpretation of Article I, Section 20, but the court has not yet had the opportunity 
to undertake the analysis.  Additionally, given the limited number of constitutional 
challenges brought by parties seeking a civil jury trial in Maine, the jury trial right 
has never been determined for many types of civil actions.  This part of the Comment 
will analyze the right to a jury trial for several common civil actions and violations 
under the court’s most recent interpretation of Article I, Section 20.166 
Civil claims and violations fall into several categories depending on the jury trial 
rights they hold.  First, we will consider the claims that hold a right to a jury trial 
because suits of the same general nature held such a right prior to 1820.  These types 
of claims have a jury trial right under the DePaolo interpretation of Article I, Section 
20, but would also hold a jury trial right under the narrower Anton interpretation.  
One example of this type of claim is a small claim proceeding, as discussed earlier 
in our analysis of Ela v. Pelletier.  Another example is a civil judicial forfeiture.  In 
1999, the court held in State v. One 1981 Chevrolet Monte Carlo167 that “long before 
the adoption of the United States Constitution the common law courts in the Colonies 
. . . were exercising jurisdiction in rem in the enforcement of forfeiture statutes.”168  
                                                                                                     
 163. Opinion of the Justices, 315 A.2d at 854. 
 164. See N. Sch. Congregate Hous. v. Merrithew, 558 A.2d 1189, 1192 (Me. 1989). 
 165. See id.; see also In re Shane T., 544 A.2d 1295, 1296-97 (Me. 1988). 
 166. See Addendum, infra Part VI, for an outline of the current jury trial right in Maine for several 
types of civil actions.   
 167. 1999 ME 69, ¶ 7, 728 A.2d 1259. 
 168. Id. (quoting C.J. Hendry Co. v. Moore, 318 U.S. 133, 139 (1943)). 
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For several actions, the court has undertaken a historical analysis to limit the 
jury trial right.  These include small claims169 and Forcible Entry and Detainer (FED) 
actions.170  The court reasoned that because, prior to 1820, the right to a jury trial 
was only available de novo on appeal, both of these actions hold a jury trial right 
today only on appeal from a bench trial in the District Court.171  The one exception 
is in FED cases in which title is raised as an issue, which are granted a jury trial 
through removal to the Superior Court without first requiring a bench trial.172 
The second category includes claims that do not hold a right to a jury trial 
because, at common law, they were heard in equity without a jury in the Court of 
Chancery.173  Examples of these actions include proceedings to terminate parental 
rights174 as well as actions of civil judicial forfeiture.175  In 1988, the court 
determined there to be no jury trial right for termination of parental rights 
proceedings in In re Shane T.176  In this case, Shane T.’s father, George, appealed 
the probate court’s termination of his parental rights, claiming that the probate court 
proceeding violated his right to a jury trial under Article I, Section 20.177  The court 
used the DePaolo interpretation of the provision in its analysis, but stated that this 
case was “sharply distinguished from DePaolo,” in which the remedy sought was a 
monetary judgment.178  In contrast, the remedy sought in this case was a “coercive, 
injunctive-type order against the father governing his future relationship with his 
son.”179  The court stated that although the termination of parental rights statute 
specifically at issue in this case was a recent statutory creation, similar suits adjusting 
the relationship between parent and child were heard in equity without the 
intervention of a jury prior to 1820.180  The court’s analysis was similar in Kennebec 
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Kueter,181 where the court held in an interlocutory appeal 
that there is no jury trial right for a mortgagee bringing a civil foreclosure action.182  
The court determined the action to be equitable in nature, because under 
Massachusetts statute prior to the adoption of the Maine Constitution, “matters 
related to a mortgage foreclosure were within the equity jurisdiction of the court.”183 
The third category of actions are those in which the court has found in favor of 
a jury trial right because the exceptions found in Article I, Section 20 do not apply.  
                                                                                                     
 169. See Ela v. Pelletier, 495 A.2d 1225, 1228 (Me. 1985). 
 170. See Merrithew, 558 A.2d at 1192. 
 171. See id. at 1196 (stating that “except in title cases, the appropriate procedure is to provide a de 
novo jury trial only on appeal after judgment is first entered in the District Court.”); see also Ela, 495 
A.2d at 1228 (holding that “According to statutory law of Massachusetts at the time the Maine 
Constitution was adopted, a party in a small claim case . . . for an amount not exceeding a statutory limit, 
had the right to a jury trial de novo on appeal at the Superior Court. 1783 Mass. Acts ch. 42.”). 
 172. Merrithew, 558 A.2d at 1196. 
 173. See In re Shane T., 544 A.2d 1295, 1297 (Me. 1988). 
 174. Id.  
 175. State v. One 1981 Chevrolet Monte Carlo, 1999 ME 69, ¶ 7, 728 A.2d 1259. 
 176. 544 A.2d at 1297. 
 177. Id. at 1296. 
 178. Id. at 1297 (citing City of Portland v. DePaolo, 531 A.2d 669, 671 (Me. 1987)). 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
 181. 1997 ME 123, 695 A.2d 1201. 
 182. Id. ¶ 1. 
 183. Id. ¶ 5 (first citing 1785 Mass. Acts 474-75; then citing 1798 Mass. Acts 127). 
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These include: possession of marijuana,184 possession of drug paraphernalia,185 and 
a violation of a city pornography ordinance.186  Parties to these three actions would 
have certainly had no right to a jury trial under Anton.  In State v. DiPietro, the State 
argued that DiPietro had no jury trial right under Anton, because “no civil suit in 
1819 . . . would have been comparable to such a proceeding.”187  Justice Studstrup 
pointed to the court’s shift in its interpretation of Article I, Section 20 in DePaolo, 
and concluded, “DePaolo seems to be the controlling law at the present time, and the 
State has failed to demonstrate that possession of marijuana (or any other type of 
contraband) was not previously entitled to a jury trial.”188 
Because of the unique nature of the Juvenile Code, juvenile proceedings fall 
outside the analysis otherwise used to determine the jury trial right in adult 
proceedings.189  The court has held there to be no jury trial right in juvenile 
proceedings due to the unique rehabilitative purpose of the State’s juvenile justice 
system and the Maine Juvenile Code.190  In 1979, the court considered the issue in 
State v. Gleason.191  Rather than analyze whether the juvenile had a right to a jury 
trial under Article I, Section 7 or Article I, Section 20, the court focused on the due 
process requirements of the Federal Constitution to determine whether a jury trial 
right existed for the defendant.192  The court determined that the procedural 
safeguards afforded an adult criminal defendant must be afforded a juvenile, unless 
these safeguards “compel the States to abandon or displace any of the substantive 
benefits of the juvenile process.”193  As the court concluded that it “cannot say that 
the juvenile’s interest in obtaining a jury determination outweighs the State’s 
continuing interest in the existence of an independent and unique juvenile justice 
system,” no jury trial right exists in juvenile proceedings.194  This result has not been 
successfully challenged since Gleason, therefore, the lack of a jury trial right would 
likely extend to other juvenile statutory violations as well, including Illegal 
Possession by Minors,195 and Illegal Transportation by Minors.196 
The Law Court has not yet had the opportunity to determine the right to a jury 
trial for a number of civil actions.  For example, the jury trial right for statutory 
violations for possessing a “dog at large”197 and keeping a dangerous dog198 have not 
been challenged in Maine to date.  These are both civil violations with a penalty of 
a fine up to $1000, and additional penalties as serious as euthanizing the animal can 
                                                                                                     
 184. State v. DePietro, KENSC-CV-2005-VI-04-03 at 1 (Me. Super. Ct., Ken. Cty., Feb. 23, 2005). 
 185. Id. 
 186. City of Portland v. DePaolo, 531 A.2d 669, 670 (Me. 1987). 
 187. State v. DePietro, KENSC-CV-2005-VI-04-03 at 2 (Me. Super. Ct., Ken. Cty., Feb. 23, 2005) 
(quoting State v. Anton, 463 A.2d 703, 709 (Me. 1983)). 
 188. Id. at 3. 
 189. See State v. Gleason, 404 A.2d 573, 582 (Me. 1979). 
 190. Id. at 583-85. 
 191. Id. at 573. 
 192. Id. at 580. 
 193. Id. (quoting In re Winship 397 U.S. 358, 367 (1970)). 
 194. Id. at 585. 
 195. 28 M.R.S.A. § 2051 (2007 & Supp. 2015). 
 196. 28-A M.R.S.A. § 2052 (2015). 
1.  197. 7 M.R.S.A. § 3911 (2015). 
 198. Id. § 3952. 
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be sanctioned if an individual is found responsible for keeping a dangerous dog.199  
Under the DePaolo interpretation of Article I, Section 20, we must examine “suits 
of the same general nature” to determine whether a right to a jury trial exists.200  
Although these violations are statutory, they are similar in nature to nuisance actions 
at common law, which were heard in the Court of Common Pleas where jury trials 
were available.201 Because these suits of the same general nature were not precluded 
from the right to a jury trial at common law, parties to dog at large or keeping a 
dangerous dog actions should have an affirmative jury trial right. 
IV,  DEPAOLO AS THE PROPER LEGAL OUTCOME IN  
MAINE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE 
The Law Court’s reversal of the Anton interpretation of Article I, Section 20 in 
its DePaolo decision was the proper legal outcome, and an outcome that is important 
to Maine jurisprudence for several reasons.  First, the Law Court’s reversal properly 
restored the right to a jury trial to one that is consistent with the plain meaning of the 
text of Article I, Section 20 of the Maine Constitution.  Second, DePaolo, along with 
subsequent decisions including North School Congregate Housing, restored judicial 
consistency, marking a return to the interpretation of Article I, Section 20 used 
without fail by the Law Court from 1821 to 1985.202  The DePaolo decision also 
restored an exceptionally strong jury trial mandate that, prior to Anton, had been 
rigorously upheld by the Law Court since its decision in Johnson’s Case in 1821.203  
Finally, the reversal of Anton reflects the Law Court’s recognition that the Maine 
Constitution is separate and distinct from the United States Constitution, which 
should provide another layer of constitutional protection for Maine citizens. 
Under both the Maine Constitution and the Federal Constitution, the availability 
of a jury trial varies based on the type of action in question, and how that action was 
adjudicated at common law.  In both Maine cases and federal cases, the results of 
this analysis can seem counterintuitive.  For example, a jury trial is available in a 
small claims case, but it is not available in an action to terminate parental rights, an 
action whose outcome is likely to have a much greater impact on the parties involved.  
Whether the right to a civil jury trial should be based on the gravity of the action in 
question, rather than the procedural process that existed at common law, is a question 
for the legislature, not the judiciary, and is beyond the scope of this paper.  What 
must be considered, however, when analyzing the Law Court’s decisions on the right 
to a jury trial under the Maine Constitution, is the danger of arbitrary results that 
stem from inconsistent constitutional interpretation.    
One of the more troubling aspects of the Anton decision was the Law Court’s 
disregard for the doctrine of stare decisis.  Rather than addressing its departure from 
well-established precedent, the Law Court simply wrote as though its interpretation 
                                                                                                     
 199. Id.  
 200. N. Sch. Congregate Hous. v. Merrithew, 558 A.2d 1189, 1190 (Me. 1989). 
 201. THOMAS J. ARNOLD, REPORTS OF CASES ARGUED AND DETERMINED IN THE COURT OF COMMON 
PLEAS 25 (1840).   
 202. Petruccelli & McKay, supra note 17, at 246. 
 203. See, e.g., id. at 240 (“From the beginning, the Law Court has consistently recognized that the jury 
trial mandates of the Maine constitution are exceptionally rigorous.”). 
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was a widely accepted one.  The primary way the Law Court did so was by 
erroneously citing several Maine cases as supporting its interpretation of Article I, 
Section 20.  These cases do not in any way support the interpretation of the provision 
offered by Anton.  The first case cited is State v. Sklar,204 which addresses only the 
right to a jury trial in a criminal proceeding under Article I, Section 6 of the Maine 
Constitution.205  The other cases cited206 establish the principle that types of actions 
that would have been heard in a court of equity at common law do not hold a 
Constitutional right to a jury trial, but they do not support the Law Court’s 
interpretation in Anton that only cases that held a jury trial right at common law 
currently hold such a right.   
There are significant fairness implications to the Law Court’s disregard for legal 
precedent.  Although the request for a jury trial is exercised somewhat infrequently 
in Maine courts, the Law Court’s inconsistency may have also resulted in the denial 
of other jury trial requests in the district court under Anton.  Fortunately, the Law 
Court mitigated the number of inconsistent outcomes and unfair treatment for those 
individuals seeking a jury trial by reversing course through its decision in DePaolo 
fairly quickly.   
The Law Court’s departure from stare decisis in this line of cases was criticized 
in an article written by Thad B. Zmistowski in 1989.207  Interestingly, Zmistowski 
criticized the Law Court for disregarding its precedent established by Anton in its 
decision in DePaolo.208  The author did not examine the history of the court’s 
interpretation of Article I, Section 20, which establishes that Anton is the outlier from 
precedent on the issue of the civil jury trial right, not DePaolo.  Nonetheless, by 
failing to address its departure from established precedent in any way in either Anton 
or DePaolo, the court ignored the time-honored principle of stare decisis and 
contributed to a period of inconsistent decisions and confusion in the law.   
The Law Court’s correction in DePaolo is in line with the principle of new 
judicial federalism, which holds that state constitutions are critically important in 
determining the legal rights of state citizens.  Maine is one of many states that have 
extended greater Constitutional protections to its citizens than are granted under the 
Federal Constitution.209  The differences between state constitutions and the Federal 
Constitution are frequently overlooked, and federal constitutional law is often 
substituted for careful analysis of the unique language of each state’s Constitution, 
an approach known as “lockstepping,”210 that was present in Anton.  For provisions 
                                                                                                     
 204. 317 A.2d 160 (Me. 1974).   
 205. Id. at. 161.   
 206. The Anton court cited the following cases in holding no right to a civil jury trial unless that right 
affirmatively existed for such an action at common law: Portland Pipe Line Corp. v. Envtl. Improvement 
Comm’n, 307 A.2d 1, 28 (Me. 1973), appeal dismissed, 414 U.S. 1035 (1973); Farnsworth v. Whiting, 
106 Me. 430, 76 A. 909 (1910) (citing Parker v. Simpson, 62 N.E. 401 (Mass. 1902)); see Opinion of the 
Justices, 315 A.2d 847 (Me. 1974) (upholding workers' compensation law); Kennebec Water Dist. v. City 
of Waterville, 96 Me. 234, 52 A. 774 (1902) (examining condemnation proceedings); cf. Ashley v. Wait, 
116 N.E. 961 (Mass. 1917). 463 A.2d at 708-09. 
 207. Zmistowski, supra note 69, at 203. 
 208. Id. 
 209. See Brennan, supra note 46, at 500.   
 210. Friedman, supra note 42 (“Under the lockstep approach, the state constitutional analysis begins 
and ends with consideration of the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation of the textual provision at issue.”). 
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of the Bill of Rights that have not been incorporated to the states,211 it is the role of 
state courts to interpret the language of the state’s unique constitutional provisions 
independently.  By substituting interpretations of federal constitutional provisions 
for analysis of unique provisions of state constitutions, state courts eliminate a 
parallel source of constitutional rights.   
In analyzing the Anton decision in light of the three methods of state 
constitutional interpretation introduced in Part I,212 the Law Court’s method of 
interpretation aligns most closely with the “lockstepping” approach.  The glaring 
departure from over one hundred years of precedent in Maine, as well as from the 
plain text of the statute, makes the court’s interpretation of Article I, Section 20 an 
extreme example of the substitution of federal constitutional law for independent 
analysis of the state constitution.  By limiting the scope of individual rights under 
the Maine constitution to those guaranteed under the Federal Constitution, the Anton 
court significantly narrowed the jury trial right that had existed for over one hundred 
years in the state of Maine.  
 The Anton court could have used either the criteria approach or the primacy 
approach to its interpretation of Article I, Section 20 to arrive at the proper result.  
Under the criteria approach, the court would determine that the plain text of Article 
I, Section 20 differed significantly from the text of the Seventh Amendment, 
warranting an independent interpretation of the provision.  The court could bolster 
its analysis by looking at prior case law, which supports the deviation from the 
interpretation of the Seventh Amendment.  Finally, the Law Court’s unwavering 
commitment to a broad jury trial right throughout Maine history supports the 
deviation from the federal interpretation of the Seventh Amendment.  
V.  CONCLUSION 
The reversal of the Anton interpretation of Article I, Section 20 repaired judicial 
consistency, demonstrated sound textual interpretation of the Maine Constitution, 
and recognized the Maine Constitution as a unique source of rights for its citizens.  
As Justice Brennan so eloquently stated: 
[S]tate courts cannot rest when they have afforded their citizens the full protections 
of the [F]ederal Constitution.  State constitutions, too, are a font of individual 
liberties, their protections often extending beyond those required by the Supreme 
Court's interpretation of federal law.  The legal revolution which has brought federal 
law to the fore must not be allowed to inhibit the independent protective force of 
state law – for without it, the full realization of our liberties cannot be guaranteed.213 
Maine has an admirable tradition of upholding a rigorous jury trial right as 
guaranteed by her own constitution, despite ongoing pressures to make the judiciary 
more efficient, as well as the procedural complications that can arise when honoring 
a broad civil jury trial right.  Despite a centuries-old tradition of rigorously defending 
                                                                                                     
 211. Provisions of the Bill of Rights that have not been incorporated to the states include the Second 
Amendment, the Third Amendment, the grand jury indictment clause of the Fifth Amendment, and the 
Seventh Amendment. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 765 n.13 (2010). 
 212. See supra pp. 1-5. 
 213. Brennan, supra note 46, at 491. 
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the broad right to a jury trial in Maine, the Law Court’s decision in Anton shows how 
fragile these rights can be if interpreted without rigorous analysis and respect for 
historical precedent.  Through one poorly crafted and poorly supported decision, the 
Law Court reversed its long-standing interpretation of Maine’s provision 
guaranteeing a jury trial in civil cases, and eliminated the right to a jury trial for many 
plaintiffs in many types of actions.  Fortunately, the damage caused by Anton was 
mitigated by the Law Court’s fairly quick reversal in DePaolo.  Nonetheless, a 
historical analysis of Anton illustrates the importance of state constitutions as a 
source of individual rights for state citizens, as well as the influence of the judiciary 






194 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:1 
VI.  ADDENDUM 
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